Why India and the U.S. Dominate the Conversation When Bangladesh Holds an Election
In Bangladesh, elections rarely stay confined within national borders. Alongside political conflict and violence, there has long been a habit of seeking legitimacy, pressure, or support from foreign diplomats and embassies. This culture did not appear overnight. Over decades, a confrontational and self-destructive political environment has repeatedly opened the door for external influence in domestic politics. And whenever an election approaches, this tendency intensifies.
From the 1990 mass uprising to the 2024 student-led movement, Bangladesh’s fragile democracy and increasingly authoritarian two-party system have followed a familiar cycle. Foreign names and institutions keep reappearing in internal political debates. Figures like former UN official Oscar Fernández-Taranco or India’s former foreign secretary Sujatha Singh became part of political discussions. National disputes were carried to the United Nations, the Commonwealth, or Western embassies. Gradually, this created a public perception that gaining state power requires the blessing of regional or global powers.
This is why accusations of being “pro-India” or “pro-America” have become routine weapons in election campaigns. Political rivals constantly use these labels to discredit each other.
Yet the current election feels different.
After the 2024 uprising, the Awami League has been pushed out of electoral competition. The contest is now primarily between the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami’s 11-party alliance. Interestingly, there is no visible rush by political parties to directly lobby foreign embassies this time. Still, foreign influence has not disappeared. Instead, it has taken a new form.
India, Washington, Islamabad, and even Ankara are now deeply present in the narrative battlefield.
This election is less about manifestos and more about storytelling. Traditional policy documents barely matter. Candidates focus on populist promises at rallies, while the real fight happens online and in public discourse. Influencers, synchronized political speeches, AI-generated deepfakes, fake images, and coordinated bot networks have become the primary tools for shaping voter perception.
One major narrative being pushed is that the BNP is an “India-backed party.” While this claim circulates aggressively, the BNP itself has responded cautiously. When Jamaat leaders accused BNP of secret agreements with India, BNP officially dismissed the claims as baseless propaganda, demanding evidence and calling it a deliberate attempt to mislead voters.
At the same time, a Washington Post report added fuel to the fire. The article suggested that U.S. diplomats believe Jamaat-e-Islami could achieve its best electoral result ever and that Washington is quietly trying to build better relations with the party. This report triggered widespread debate. Public intellectual Farhad Mazhar described it as a dangerous signal, arguing that nearly all Bangladeshi political parties maintain some form of relationship with the United States, directly or indirectly.
BNP leaders later echoed this concern in campaign speeches, warning that secret alignments with global powers could harm Bangladesh’s sovereignty.
Jamaat, however, has largely avoided formal clarification. While some leaders downplayed the report as mere journalistic observation, others openly claimed in rallies that even the U.S. now supports Jamaat’s leadership vision for a corruption-free Bangladesh. Meetings between Jamaat leaders and Western diplomats, including the U.S., UK, and EU ambassadors, further intensified speculation.
Criticism also came from other Islamist parties. Leaders of Islamic Andolon Bangladesh accused Jamaat of double standards, publicly saying one thing while holding closed-door meetings with foreign embassies. These accusations reinforced the idea that something hidden might be happening behind the scenes.
Meanwhile, India remains the most sensitive topic. New Delhi has given unconditional support to the Awami League, and many of its leaders are currently active from Indian soil. As a result, “India” dominates election narratives more than any other country. Long before campaigns officially began, influencers and rival parties worked to portray BNP as India’s preferred option.
Jamaat leaders repeatedly accused BNP of secret deals with India, even claiming Bangladesh would be “sold” in exchange for power. Ironically, Jamaat’s own manifesto speaks of peaceful and fair relations with all neighboring countries, including India.
The information war has gone even further. AI-generated fake images recently circulated online, claiming BNP leaders were meeting Indian intelligence officials. Fact-checkers later proved these images were fabricated, but the damage to public perception was already done.
BNP, for its part, has avoided emotional retaliation. Party leader Tarique Rahman’s campaign message has remained consistent: no Delhi, no Rawalpindi, no Washington first. Only Bangladesh.
In response, BNP has revived Jamaat’s controversial role during the 1971 Liberation War, reminding voters of the party’s collaboration with Pakistani forces. This historical memory has become another powerful narrative weapon.
Bangladesh now stands at a critical crossroads. The February 12 election is taking place at a time when the post-World War II global order is visibly collapsing. The United States, especially under Donald Trump’s return to power, has shown that alliances are transactional, not permanent. The world is moving toward a multipolar reality.
In this fragile global moment, Bangladesh’s internal crises are severe. Massive unemployment, widespread poverty, and a lack of new economic opportunities are creating explosive conditions. Political storytelling, populism, and foreign name-dropping cannot solve these real problems.
An election may be held on Bangladeshi soil, but unless politics returns to real solutions instead of foreign shadows, the country risks repeating the same cycle once again.

